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ABSTRACT
Peer-to-Peer (P2P) networks have emerged as a significant social
phenomenon for the distribution of information goods and may become an
important alternative to traditional client-server network architectures for
knowledge sharing within enterprises. This paper reviews and synthesizes the
relevant computer science and economics literatures as they relate to P2P
networks, and raises important questions for researchers interested in studying
the behavior of these networks from the perspective of the economics of
information technology.
With regard to the economic characteristics of these networks, we show
that while the characteristics of services provided over P2P networks are similar
to public goods and club goods, they have many important differences and hence
there is a need for new theoretical models as well as empirical and experimental
analysis to understand P2P user behavior. We then identify several important
areas for study with regard to the economics of P2P networks and review recent
academic papers in each area.
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INTRODUCTION

CONTRIBUTION

Peer-to-peer (P2P) networks allow a
distributed community of users to share
resources in the form of information, digital
content, storage space, or processing capacity.
The novel aspect of these networks is that, in
contrast to client-server networks where all
network content is located in a central
location, P2P resources are located in and
provided by computers at the edge of the
network (a.k.a. “peers”).

This paper contributes to IS research in
several ways. First, we discuss prominent P2P
architectures and applications. Second, we
highlight several significant economic
characteristics of these networks and compare
these characteristics to similar characteristics
in the economics literature. Third, we review
the nascent literature integrating economics
into the study of the performance and design
of P2P networks with a focus on the recent
2003 Workshop on the Economics of Peer-toPeer networks at the University of California
at Berkeley. Fourth, we identify and discuss
important areas for future research in this
domain.

It is interesting to note that while they
are perceived to be a recent phenomenon, P2P
networks have their origins in many of the
early Internet applications and architectures.
Internet Relay Chat (IRC), which was
developed in the late 1980s, was one of the
first P2P services on the Internet. IRC allowed
for the transmission of text messages, and later
digital content, directly between groups of
network users. Likewise, the Domain Name
System, and Usenet bulletin boards exhibit
elements of P2P design. Thus, it can be argued
that the P2P design concept is embedded in
many of the original Internet protocols and
applications (Minar and Hedlund 2001).
Still, the widespread popularization of
P2P at the consumer level can be traced to the
release of the Napster file-sharing program in
May 1999. Napster was developed in a matter
of months by Shawn Fanning, then a
Northeastern University student. Initially
distributed to 30 friends, the program grew to
25 million users worldwide within its first 12
months of operation (Strahilevitz 2002).
In all P2P file-sharing networks, the
content resides with the network users. The
only difference between the architecture of
these networks is the nature of the catalog of
this content. In Napster and OpenNap (an open
source version of the Napster protocol) the
catalog of content is centralized in a single
server or a set of mirrored servers to
accomplish load balancing (Asvanund, Clay,
Krishnan, and Smith 2003). Users who logged
into the Napster network would automatically
upload a list of the content they were sharing
to a mirrored set of central content databases
owned by Napster.
Users who wanted to access content on
the network would issue a query against this
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central database that would then point them to
a list of peers who had the content on their
computer. The Napster program at the peer
initiating the search would then automatically
issue a ping message to each of the peers in the
list of search results to determine the level of
congestion on the network and at the peer. The
Napster client would then display the search
results in a tabular format with the names of
the files returned by the search along with the
file size and length, bitrate and encoding
frequency, and the name of the user along with
the user’s self-reported connection speed and
ping time (Figure 1).
The searching peer could then decide
which of these search results they were
interested in accessing, and initiate a file
download directly from the peer who provided
the content. This architecture gave users a high
degree of visibility to content on the network
and thus improved the ease of user search.
However, it also introduced a vulnerability to
the network: The network ceased to function if
the central servers were shutdown, as a judge
ordered Napster to do following a lawsuit filed
by the Recording Industry Association of
American (RIAA).
Many networks that have emerged
following Napster’s demise have adopted a
decentralized or hybrid catalog of content to
reduce both legal and technical risks from the
loss of the central server and to reduce the
monetary investment required to operate the
network by distributing database management
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Figure 1: Napster Search Results

responsibilities to the individual peers
(Asvanund, Clay, Krishnan, and Smith 2003).
Gnutella 0.4, Gnutella 0.6, and Kazaa are
notable examples of such networks.
The Gnutella 0.4 protocol features a
distributed catalog of files. To connect to the
network, a Gnutella peer would establish
simultaneous connections to approximately 3
other peers on the network. These peers would
also maintain simultaneous connections to
other peers. In this mesh architecture, peers
maintain a list of their own files. A peer can
issue a search to its neighbors with a time-tolive (TTL) definition. This search will be
forwarded up to the number of times defined
by the TTL field (typically 7). If a peer
receiving the search message has the requested
content, they will send a reply back through
the chain to the originating peer. The
advantage of this architecture is that Gnutella
0.4 networks do not have a central point of
vulnerability.
However, a disadvantage of this
architecture is that the finite TTL field on
query packets limits the size of the network
that a peer is able to access. The Gnutella 0.4
protocol limits the number of peers that can be

reached by a query to 10,000 regardless of the
size of the network (Kirk 2003). This problem
is exacerbated by the fact that queries are
passed among peers who may have
significantly limited bandwidth (for example,
modem users). These bandwidth limits result
in large numbers of dropped packets and in
practice limit the effective reach of a Gnutella
0.4 query to between 5,000 and 8,000 peers.
The Gnutella 0.6 and Kazaa protocols
adopt a hybrid architectural design that relaxes
some of these scalability problems. In each of
these networks a small set of computers are
selected to maintain local content databases. In
Gnutella 0.6 these are called ultrapeers and in
Kazaa they are called supernodes. In both
cases peers on the network indicate their
willingness to serve as local content databases
and are selected for this task by the network
protocol. Ultrapeers and supernodes are
selected from the pool of available peers based
on their available bandwidth resources and
tenure on the network (a proxy for stability).
Other peers connect directly to these ultrapeers
and upload their list of content as in the
Napster protocol. The ultrapeers are then
interconnected in much the same way as peers
on a Gnutella 0.4 network. Searches for
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content are first issued to the ultrapeer and
then these queries propagate to other
interconnected ultrapeers using the same TTL
field discussed above. Compared to Gnutella
0.4’s
decentralized
architecture,
these
networks have the advantage of increased
content visibility and enable more efficient
search. Still it is important to note that interultrapeer connections are limited by the TTL
field in Gnutella 0.6 and thus the effective size
of a user’s local network is still limited versus
a centralized architecture. Compared to
Napster’s centralized architecture, shutdown
risks are minimized because new ultrapeers
can be selected if some existing ultrapeers are
disabled. More details on both the Gnutella 0.4
and Gnutella 0.6 protocols are available in
Kirk (2003).
File sharing using these and similar
networks has been called the “killer app” of
P2P, and rightly so. The Yankee group
estimates that consumers swapped over 5
billion music files over P2P networks in 2001
(Dignan 2002). A recent study by Ipsos-Reid
finds that 23% of the American population
over age the age of 12 has downloaded MP3s
over the Internet (Ipsos-Reid 2002). This
proportion is likely to be much higher among
the 12-21 year-old demographic critical to the
music and movie industries. In 2000, a Gartner
study found that Napster accounted for up to
75% of the traffic on some university LANs
(Shuchman 2000). More recently, the March
2002 shutdown of the Morpheus P2P network
resulted in a 50% drop in the number of
packets sent on Carnegie Mellon’s wireless
network (Sirbu 2002).
However, while P2P file sharing
networks are among the most popular
applications of P2P technology, P2P
technology is also gaining adoption in a
variety of other arenas. For example, P2P
networks are being used for distributed
computing (e.g., SETI@Home), enterprise
knowledge sharing (e.g., Bad Blue), and user
collaboration (e.g., Groove Networks).
Further, while most of the previous examples
of consumer P2P networks have a high
proportion of copyrighted content, there is no
reason that Digital Rights Management (DRM)
cannot be incorporated into such P2P
networks. For example, the subscription-based
Napster service launched in early 2002 used
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DRM technology within its P2P architecture to
protect copyright holders. Subsequently,
Altnet has proposed a similar scheme as an
overlay to the Kazaa network.
A great deal of research has analyzed
the technical features of these networks,
particularly on improving the efficiency of
P2P indexing schemes (e.g., Ratnasamy,
Francis, Handley, Karp, and Shenker 2001;
Stoica, Morris, Karger, Kaashoek, and
Balakrishnan 2001), content caching schemes
(e.g., Druschel and Rowstrown 2001;
Bhattacharjee, Chawathe, Gopalakrishnan,
Keleher, and Silaghi 2003), and architectural
designs (e.g., Kirk 2003; Sripanidkulchai,
Maggs, and Zhang 2003). Until recently little
research has been conducted regarding the
economic characteristics of P2P networks and
how these economic characteristics might
impact their design and operation. The
remainder of this paper seeks to highlight this
important area of P2P and proceeds as follows.
In section 2, we analyze the economic
characteristics of peer-to-peer networks
focusing on comparing the services offered
over peer-to-peer networks to traditional
private, public, and club goods. In section 3,
we identify important areas of research
integrating an economic perspective into the
analysis of P2P networks and review selected
recent papers in each area. In section 4, we
conclude and discuss fruitful areas for future
economic research relating to peer-to-peer
networks.

UNDERSTANDING THE ECONOMICS OF
P2P NETWORKS
While P2P networks vary in their
architectural design, files are always
transferred directly between the computers of
peers connected to the network. Further, once
these files have been delivered the user
downloading the file, by default, becomes a
provider of that content. Thus, in an ideal case
the provision of content on the network will
scale to match the level of demand for the
content. To the extent this holds, P2P networks
share some of the characteristics of public
goods and club goods (Asvanund, Clay,
Krishnan, and Smith 2003).
Public goods are goods that have the
characteristics of non-excludability in supply
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and non-rivalry in demand (Hardin 1968).
Non-excludability in supply means that
individuals can’t be excluded from consuming
the product — if the product is provided to one
person in a community it must be provided to
everyone. Non-rivalry in demand means that
one user’s consumption of a product does not
diminish another user’s value of that product.
Typical examples of public goods include
clean air, national defense, and public radio
and television broadcasts.
In contrast to public goods, club goods
are goods that are excludable in supply but
non-rival in demand. Thus, the number of
people with access to the good can be limited,
but contingent on having access to the good,
the consumption of the good by one user does
not reduce the utility of other users. Cable and
satellite television broadcasts and private
swimming pools are typical examples of club
goods.
P2P networks share some of the
economic properties of public and club goods.
In the ideal case, P2P networks will
approximate both non-excludability in supply
and non-rivalry in demand. Non-excludability
is accomplished because network resources are
typically provided to all members of the
network equally. Non-rivalry is accomplished
because, given that a downloading user shares
the content they download, the net number of
opportunities to download will not decrease
for other users on the network.
However, this non-rivalry property will
not hold if some network users consume
network resources but do not share their
content in return. These users are commonly
known as free-riders and free-riding is a
common characteristic of P2P networks. For
example, Adar and Huberman (2000) observe
that 66% of Gnutella 0.4 users were free-riding
in August 2000. Similarly, Asvanund,
Krishnan, Smith, and Telang (2003) observe
that 42% of Gnutella 0.6 users were free-riding
in September 2002. In the presence of freeriding, P2P networks will exhibit levels of
rivalry — the consumption of network
resources by a free-riding user will diminish
the level of utility offered by the network to
other users. This level of rivalry, combined
with the non-excludability of network
resources discussed above distinguishes

resources provided by P2P networks from
either public goods or club goods.
Asvanund, Clay, Krishnan, and Smith
(2003) identify several other differences
between resources provided over P2P
networks and other typical public and club
goods. First, they note that the size of the
offering of a public or club good is typically
discrete and fixed. A swimming pool, for
example, has a fixed size. In contrast, the size
of the offering of P2P goods is typically
relatively continuous and variable because it is
a function of the type of content shared by
network users and the number of users who
share. A second difference noted by the
authors is that in public or club goods settings
the default choice of users is typically noncontribution, whereas in most P2P client
programs contribution is enabled by default.
Strahilevitz (2002) notes that this is an
important factor in establishing community
norms around sharing. A third difference is
that contribution in P2P networks is linked to
consumption and is in the form of network
resources whereas in typical public and club
goods environments contribution is separate
from consumption and is in the form of a
monetary payment. This linkage between the
consumption and provision of P2P network
resources has implications for the formation
and sustainability of P2P networks as shown
by Krishnan, Smith, Tang, and Telang (2003).
In spite of these differences between
public and club goods and P2P network
resources, there are important similarities
between the provision of these goods. For
example, an important observation from the
public goods literature that seems to
extrapolate to P2P networks is the inability of
individually rational behavior to bring about
socially optimal outcomes. In typical
economic models, individual economic actors
will only consider their private utility when
making consumption and provision decisions
— they will not consider the impact (a.k.a. the
externality) this decision will impose on other
community members. Because of this, in the
absence of outside incentives, the selfinterested consumption of public goods may
deplete the overall public utility. This is
popularity known as the “tragedy of the
commons” (Hardin 1968). Common examples
of such “tragedies” include over-grazing by
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farmers using public lands and over-fishing of
public waters.

ANALYZING THE ECONOMICS OF P2P
NETWORKS

In the context of P2P networks similar
situations are observed relating to both overconsumption
and
under-provision
of
community resources. Over-consumption of
network resources might occur because, when
deciding whether to initiate a download from
the network, P2P users may only consider their
private utility of initiating that download and
not the congestion this download will impose
on other network users. Likewise, underprovision might occur because, when deciding
whether to share, users may only consider their
private costs of sharing (e.g., reduced
bandwidth) and not the benefits their sharing
provides to other network users. This will lead
to levels of free-riding above the optimal level
for the community.1 Indeed, as noted above,
most P2P networks exhibit high levels of freeriding. These high levels of free-riding led
Adar and Huberman (2000) to observe “freeriding leads to degradation of the system
performance…if this trend continues copyright
issues might become moot compared to the
possible collapse of such systems.”

Incentives

Will the economic characteristics of
resource provision on P2P networks lead to the
ultimate collapse of such systems? Can user
incentives be designed into such systems to
forestall such a collapse? How can trust be
enhanced among a set of distributed selfinterested peers? What are the implications of
P2P systems on the balance between the rights
of copyright holders, network entrepreneurs,
and users? We raise these and related areas for
research in the next section. We also review
selected recent papers in each area with a focus
on selected papers presented at the 2003
Workshop on the Economics of P2P Networks
at the University of California at Berkeley.2

1

In the case of downloads that involve copyrighted
material, one could also argue that the provider or
downloader of the content might only consider their
private utility from provision or consumption and
not the externality this action would impose on
content producers.

2

More information is available on this conference
at the conference website:
http://www.sims.berkeley.edu/research/conferences/
p2pecon/
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One obvious question raised by the
previous section is how user behavior will
respond to the economic characteristics of P2P
networks and how can network designers
influence this behavior through incentive
mechanisms. This question is particularly
important in light of recent observations of the
importance of incentive alignment for
Information Technology design (Ba, Stallaert,
and Whinston 2001). One obvious area where
economic incentives find application in P2P
networks is controlling free-riding behavior on
the part of users.
As noted above, free-riding behavior
occurs when a user consumes network
resources without providing any resources in
return, and this situation may deteriorate in
larger P2P networks where social norms are
likely to be weakened (Olson 1968). A variety
of solutions have been proposed to reduce the
problem of free-riding on P2P networks. The
most common proposal follows a pricing
model, where incentive compatibility is
achieved by pricing a scarce network resource
(e.g., MacKie-Mason and Varian 1995; Wang,
Peha, and Sirbu 1996). In the spirit of pricing
network resources, Golle Leyton-Brown, and
Moronov (2001) propose to charge for the use
of P2P network capacity through a system of
micro-payments. Similarly, Chandan and
Hogenborn (2001) analyze the use of micropayments in the context of wireless P2P
networks and find that micro-payments may be
able to provide an incentive compatible
solution to the free-riding problem.
However, it is also interesting to note
that direct payments between peers may be
impractical
in
many
common
P2P
implementations. For example, it is difficult to
imagine transfer payments between users of a
knowledge sharing P2P network with an
enterprise. Likewise, in many consumer P2P
networks direct micro-payments will be
difficult to implement because of the
anonymous nature of network usage. In these
settings it will be particularly important to
develop non-priced incentives to encourage
efficient behavior on the part of P2P users.
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Some examples of non-priced incentives could
include delay times (e.g., providing priority
queuing to users to share more content with
the network), network membership (e.g.,
threatening to remove non-sharing members
from the network), or peer ratings of content
providers. Krishnan, Smith, Tang, and Telang
(2003) provide an example of such an
approach. Strikingly, their model finds that it
may not be socially optimal for all users to
share depending on the cost an individual user
incurs when sharing and the value that their
sharing would provide to the remainder of the
peers on the network. They use quality-ofservice as a tuning parameter to induce the
optimal amount of sharing.
Several authors have proposed similar
non-priced mechanisms for sharing based on
implicit or explicit reciprocity among users.
For example Vishnumurthy, Chandrakumar,
and Sirer (2003) propose KARMA, a system
for tracking both user’s contribution to and
consumption of network resources. Each user
receives a particular “karma” score, increasing
in contribution and decreasing in consumption
of network resources, which governs their
future consumption of network resources.
Similarly, Kamvar, Yang, and Garcia-Molina
(2003) propose a similar scheme based on the
possibility that self-interested peers will not
forward query requests from other peers. In
their network, peers “buy and sell” the right to
respond to queries from other network users.
Ranganathan, Ripeanu, Sarin, and Foster
(2003) argue that sharing in P2P networks is
akin to the Prisoner’s Dilemma problem such
that non-sharing is the only dominant outcome.
They then argue that if the game is extended to
a multi person setting, mechanisms can be
developed to improve the level of sharing in
the network. In both these mechanisms, higher
reputation leads to better quality of service,
which in turn encourages sharing.
User Behavior and Motivation
A closely related area of inquiry
concerns what motivates users to share on P2P
networks. Is it individually rational behavior?
Altruism? Some combination of the two? The
analysis of user behavior is a fruitful area of
research, particularly given the importance of
incentive design for efficient network design.
Several

recent

papers

seek

to

understand and explain user motivations when
contributing to P2P networks. Gu and
Jarvenpaa (2003) provide an empirical study
of sharing behavior among users on P2P
technical support forums. They argue that
sharing in these settings is most consistent
with altruistic motivations. Feldman Lai,
Chuang, and Stoica (2003) on the other hand
argue that sharing does not impose as much
cost as users think in a broadband symmetric
network. But in other cases when upload and
download speeds are different (like ADSL),
sharing can lead to some latency. They also
show that prioritizing the TCP traffic could
potentially lead to better network performance
in some cases. Finally, Strahilevitz (2002)
argues that sharing occurs in network due to
“charismatic code” — the intentional
perception given to network users that sharing
is a common and normal practice in the
network.
Reputation and Trust
The development of systems to track
the reliability or consistency of a peer’s
contribution to other members of the network
is also closely related to the development of
incentive systems for P2P networks. Such
systems build on the incentive schemes
mentioned above which track a user’s
contribution in the present period (e.g.,
Krishnan, Smith, Tang, and Telang 2003), by
tracking a user’s contribution over a longer
time period.
P2P reputation systems are closely
related to the efforts of online communities,
such as eBay, to develop incentive-compatible
systems for rating the performance of a
distributed set of users (see Dellarocas 2003
for a review of this literature). However, the
design of reputation systems for P2P networks
is complicated by two factors. First, the
distributed and intermediated nature of P2P
network interactions makes it easy for users to
conceal or change their identity. Second, in
some fully distributed applications, the
administration of the rating system must also
be distributed throughout the network, making
it vulnerable to coordinated gaming strategies.
Dutta, Goel, Govindan, and Zhang (2003) and
Shneidman and Parkes (2003) discuss in more
detail the difficulties associated with fully
distributed reputation networks.
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With regard to such systems, Lai,
Feldman, Stoica, and Chuang (2003) study the
evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma (EPD). Since
EPD characterizes cooperation that requires
repetition and reputation, it needs to be
modified in the context of P2P networks
because of the lack of repeat interaction among
the peers and the easy acquisition of
pseudonyms. They introduce the concept of
“private” history and “shared” history as a way
to encourage sharing. Shared history is a
centralized pool where peers’ past behavior is
noted and services are provided according to
their reputation.
Other work in this domain includes
Moreton and Twigg (2003) who compare
reputation
mechanisms
with
payment
mechanisms and then argue that “stamp
trading” mechanisms capture the essence of
both mechanisms quite well. Cohen (2003) on
the other hand argues that a “tit for tat”
treatment leads to a significant improvement
and robustness in a P2P network. He
demonstrates the practical implementation of
this mechanism in the context of the
BitTorrent P2P network. Kung and Wu (2003)
combine elements of incentive design with
persistent trust ratings by proposing an
admission control system that provides quality
of service differentiation to users based on a
distributed mechanism that tracks user
reputations. Woodard and Parkes (2003)
employ mechanism design techniques in the
context of network formation. They analyze
how a network of distributed, self-interested
peers might be able to form.
Reputation and trust mechanisms can
also help to protect against a coordinated
attack by an outside adversary. For example,
the RIAA and its member organizations have
recently initiated several attacks against P2P
networks by flooding the network with “fake”
files labeled to appear as though it were real
content (the economics of this strategy is
discussed in more detail below). The first
documented case of the strategic distribution
of fake files on a P2P network was in
September 2000 by the rock group Bare Naked
Ladies (Wake 2000). This was a small effort
and only targeted the Napster network. In May
2002, the practice was imitated on a larger
scale for the release of Eminem’s “The
Eminem Show” album (Avery 2002).
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Strahilevitz (2002) notes that this practice
became widespread in June 2002 with three of
the major record labels adopting the practice
for many of their artists.
Such an attack is facilitated in a
distributed network because it is difficult to
tell whether an individual offering a file is a
genuine sharer or an adversary posing as a
legitimate sharer. Rosenthal, Roussopoulos,
Maniatis, and Baker (2003) discuss
mechanisms to protect against coordinated
attacks in the context of protecting information
goods for library services.
Intellectual Property
The strategy of the RIAA is motivated
by their legitimate desire to protect their
intellectual property from unauthorized
sharing. However, this legitimate effort to
protect intellectual property can, in some
cases, collide with the interests and rights of
entrepreneurs attempting to develop novel
information sharing networks, individuals
exercising fair use rights associated with
legitimately purchased materials, and network
operators seeking to protect the privacy of
their users.
Thus, the issue of liability, privacy and
intellectual property rights on these networks
is a promising area of research that has
academic, policy and commercial implications.
From an academic perspective, a natural
question is: how much of an impact do P2P
networks have on sales of associated
information goods? Liebowitz (2001) argued
that early data suggested that the impact of
P2P networks on record industry sales was
minimal. Hui and Png (2002) have a similar
finding, arguing that P2P networks had
significant promotional value for record
companies, which militated against losses.
However, using more recent data, Liebowitz
(2003) finds that the impact may be a
significant cause of the recent downturn in
record sales.
From a policy perspective, how should
the interests of artists and copyright creators be
balanced against the interests of network users
and entrepreneurs designing new distribution
mechanisms for information goods? From the
perspective of commercial industries, is it
possible to use P2P networks as a promotional
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channel while simultaneously reducing
commercial risk from piracy as argued by Hui
and Png (2002) and what form would such a
network take?
Another
interesting
commercial
question concerns the optimal response of
copyright holders to the threat of piracy.
Recently, Varian (2003) studies the social cost
of sharing and shows that when sharing is
possible and a monopolist can observe it then
generally it can price the product such that it
leads to an inefficient outcome and low overall
welfare.
It is also possible to consider legal and
strategic options available to copyright holders
to make participation in P2P network less
attractive for users. In a typical scenario, a
user’s net utility from consuming a product is
U - p- sc where U is the utility of the product,
p is the price of the product, and sc is the
search cost associated with obtaining the
product. In the case of MP3 file sharing for a
record company’s file sharing site to yield
higher utility to a potential customer than
using a copyright-infringing site the record
company would need Ur - pr – scr > Up - scp
where the price to use the copyright-infringing
site is assumed to be 0. What is interesting for
the record companies is that, unlike in a typical
situation where they can only control their own
utility, price, and search cost, in the case of
MP3 file sharing networks they can also
influence the utility and search cost of the
competing network. One way copyright
holders can search costs is by flooding the
network with fake files and thereby increasing
user’s search costs for their desired content
(see Segal 2002 for example). In such a
scenario, the record company would register
numerous peers on the copyright-infringing
site each with a set of MP3s that use the same
naming structure as popular music content, but
which contain no usable content.3 The end
result should be to increase the number of files
a user must download before they find the
“real” content they were looking for. By
lowering the utility and increasing the search
costs of their competitors’ file sharing
networks, the record company’s web sites will
3

The companies MediaDefender and Vidius both
advertise software product to make this process
easier for the record companies.

have more flexibility in setting the utility level
of their content (e.g., by restricting the legal
uses of the files) and their prices. Copyright
holders can also threaten users with fines or
lawsuits for illegally sharing and downloading
copyrighted content. This raises the implicit
cost of users to share content, thereby
increasing free-riding, and thus reducing the
utility of the network by reducing network
performance and scalability (Asvanund, Clay,
Krishnan, Smith 2003). This strategy may
have been responsible for a 15% drop in weekto-week file-sharing traffic for the week
ending July 6, 2003 following well-publicized
lawsuits against prominent file-sharers on the
Kazaa network (Reuters 2003).
Another
interesting
commercial
question concerns the interests of Internet
service providers who provide benefit to their
users through the provision of P2P network
services, but who also incur significant costs
through the consumption of scarce bandwidth
by P2P traffic. Many colleges and universities
have found that P2P traffic makes up more
than 50% of traffic on their links to the
Internet. Similarly, a report by Sandvine.com
found that P2P packets made up 60% of the
traffic
on
major
Internet
backbone
connections. These problems are exacerbated
by the fact that connections in many popular
P2P networks are not optimized for either
similarity in user interests or similarity in user
locations with respect to the network topology.
This can result in large transit fees being borne
by the ISP seeking to provide access to P2P
applications. A natural response to these high
bandwidth requirements, and one adopted by
several Universities, is to limit the quality of
service provided to P2P packets passing
through the organization’s link to the Internet
with the intention of getting users to limit their
use of P2P. A more draconian approach is to
block all packets to and from P2P network
users. However, some alternate approaches are
emerging. For example, Asvanund, Krishnan,
Smith, and Telang (2003) propose economic
models to encourage the dynamic formation of
clubs in P2P networks based on common
interests, similar provision of resources, and
proximity with regard to network location.
Similarly, Singh, Ramabhadran, Baboescu,
and Snoren (2003) propose conditions under
which Internet Service Providers would benefit
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from sponsoring their own ultrapeers for the
provision of P2P network resources.

DISCUSSION
It is evident from the growth of P2P
networks in last 2-3 years that they are
becoming important tool for content sharing
and distribution. While the popularity of these
networks has been mainly from consumer P2P
file sharing, many organizations have been
using these networks for as knowledge
management tools to share information across
the enterprise.
A review of the recent literature on P2P
networks suggests that while technical
developments have kept pace with the growth
of these networks, the economic and social
analysis of these networks is still in a nascent
stage. Understanding P2P network operation
from the perspective of the economic
characteristics of content provision and user
behavior will be critical to developing
protocols and systems to ensure the efficient
operation of these networks.
Public and club goods provide a useful
starting point for the economic analysis of P2P
networks. P2P networks share many
characteristics with public and club goods, but
differ from these goods in important ways.
Since the literature on public goods is quite
extensive, it allows researchers to extrapolate
some of the results from this literature. But we
note that not all results are equally applicable.
Since these goods are essentially a different
class of product, we need to understand the
mechanism of these networks carefully before

applying these results. In many cases, we need
different models to understand user behavior.
Another important observation we have
noted is the existence of extensive free-riding
on these networks and its social and economic
implication. Free-riding may significantly
reduce the performance of P2P networks. A
standard result in the economic literature is
that larger groups lead to more free-riding. But
at the same time, altruism could significantly
mitigate these effects in the context of P2P
networks. As these networks continue to grow,
we need new theoretical models as well as
experimental and empirical data to understand
user behavior.
An emerging body of research seeks to
integrate economics into the study of P2P
networks. Significant questions addressed in
this research include the role of incentives in
improving
network
performance,
the
motivations of users who consume and provide
resources in P2P networks, the application of
trust and recommendation mechanisms to the
unique environments present in P2P networks,
and the balance between the rights of
copyright
holders,
entrepreneurs,
and
consumers. It will be important for future
researcher to pursue these and other relevant
questions in the coming years.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
We thank three anonymous referees
and the editors of this journal for valuable
comments on this paper. Financial support was
provided by the National Science Foundation
through grant IIS-0118767.

REFERENCES
Adar, E, B., and A. Huberman, “Free-riding on Gnutella,” First Monday, 2000, 5:10. Available at:
http://www.firstmonday.dk/issues/issue5_10/adar/index.html, last accessed 1 December 2003.
Asvanund, A., K. Clay, R. Krishnan, M. Smith, “An Empirical Analysis of Network Externalities in P2P
Music-Sharing Networks,” Working Paper, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, 2003.
Asvanund, A., R. Krishnan, M. Smith, and R. Telang, “Intelligent Club Management in Peer-to-Peer
Networks,” Working Paper, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, 2003.
Avery, S., “Hollywood Takes Aim at Online Film-Swappers,” Associated Press, July 20, 2002.
Ba, S., J. Stallaert, and A.B. Whinston, “Optimal Investment in Knowledge Within a Firm Using a Market
Mechanism,” Management Science, 2001, 47:9, pp. 1203-1219.
Bhattacharjee, B., S. Chawathe, V. Gopalakrishnan, P. Keleher, and B. Silaghi. “Efficient Peer-To-Peer
Searches Using Result-Caching,” Proceedings of Second International Workshop on Peer-to-Peer
Systems (IPTPS’03), Springer-Verlag, New York 2003. Available at: http://iptps03.cs.berkeley.edu/finalpapers/result_caching.pdf, last accessed 1 December 2003.

40

The Economics of Peer-To-Peer Networks
Chandan, S., and Hogendorn C., “The Bucket Brigade: Pricing and Network Externalities in Peer-to-Peer
Communications Networks,” Working Paper, Wesleyan University, 2001.
Cohen, B., “Incentives Build Robustness in BitTorrent,” Working Paper, 2003. Available at:
http://www.sims.berkeley.edu/research/conferences/p2pecon/papers/s4-cohen.pdf, last accessed
November 18, 2003.
Dellarocas, C., “The Digitization of Word-of-Mouth: Promise and Challenges of Online Reputation
Mechanisms,” Management Science 2003, 49:11, pp. 1407-1424.
Dignan, L., “Report: File Swapping Sites To Thrive.” ZDNet News, 2002. Available at:
http://zdnet.com.com/2100-1106-949724.html, last accessed August 16, 2002.
Druschel, P., and A. Rowstrown, “Storage Management and Caching in PAST, a Large-Scale, Persistent
Peer-to-Peer Storage Utility,” Proceedings of the 18th ACM Symposium on Operating Systems
Principles (SOSP’01), Banff, Canada, 2001.
Dutta, D., A. Goel, R. Govindan, and H. Zhang, “The Design of a Distributed Rating Scheme for Peer-toPeer Systems,” Working Paper, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA, 2003.
Feldman, M., K. Lai, J. Chuang, and I. Stoica, “Quantifying Disincentives in Peer-to-Peer Networks,”
Working Paper, University of California at Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, 2003.
Golle, P., K. Leyton-Brown, I. Mironov, “Incentives for Sharing in Peer-to-Peer Networks. Working Paper,
Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA, 2001.
Gu, B. and S. Jarvenpaa, “Are Contributions to P2P Technical Forums Private or Public Goods? - An
Empirical Investigation,” Working Paper, University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX, 2003.
Hardin, G., “The Tragedy of the Commons,” Science, 1968, 162, pp. 1243-48.
Hui, K. L., and I. Png, “Piracy and the Legitimate Demand for Recorded Music,” Working Paper, National
University of Singapore, Singapore, 2002.
Ipsos-Reid, “Press Release: Digital Music Behavior Continues to Evolve,” January 31, 2002. Available at:
http://www.ipsos-reid.com/media/dsp_displaypr_us.cfm?id_to_view=1414, last accessed on November
18, 2003.
Kamvar, S., B. Yang, and H. Garcia-Molina. “Addressing the Non-Cooperation Problem in Competitive
P2P Systems,” Working Paper, Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA, 2003.
Kirk, P., “Gnutella Protocol Development –Protocol Specification,” 2003. Available at: http://rfcgnutella.sourceforge.net/ last accessed July 5, 2003.
Krishnan R., M. Smith, Z. Tang, R. Telang, “The Virtual Commons: Why Free-riding Can Be Tolerated in
File Sharing Networks,” Working Paper, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, 2003.
Kung, H. T., C. Wu, “Differentiated Admission for Peer-to-Peer Systems: Incentivizing Peers to Contribute
Their Resources,” Working Paper, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 2003.
Lai, K., M. Feldman, I. Stoica, and J. Chuang, “Incentives for sharing in P2P networks,” Working Paper,
University of California at Berkeley, Berkeley CA, 2003.
Liebowitz, Stan, “Policing Pirates in the Networked Age,” Cato Policy Analysis No. 438, Cato Institute,
2001. Available at: http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-438es.html last accessed July 17, 2003.
Liebowitz, Stan, “Will MP3 downloads Annihilate the Record Industry? The Evidence so Far” in Libecap
ed., Advances in the Study of Entrepreneurship, Innovation, and Economic Growth, JAI Press, New
York, 2003.
MacKie-Mason, J. K., and H. Varian, “Pricing Congestible Resources,” IEEE Journal of Selected Areas in
Communications, 1995, 13:7, pp. 1141-49.
Minar, N., and M. Hedlund, “A Network of Peers: Peer-to-Peer Models Through the History of the Internet”
in Oram ed, Peer-to-Peer: Harnessing the Power of Disruptive Technologies, O’Reilly Publishing,
Cambridge, 2001, pp. 3-20.
Moreton, T. and A. Twigg, “Trading in Trust, Tokens, and Stamps,” Working Paper, Cambridge University,
Cambridge, United Kingdom, 2003.
Olson, M. The Logic of Collective Action, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965.
Ranganathan, K., M. Ripeanu, A. Sarin, and I. Foster, “To Share or Not to Share: An Analysis of Incentives
to Contribute in Collaborative File Sharing Environments,” Working Paper, University of Chicago,
The Journal of Information Technology Theory and Application (JITTA), 5:3, 2003. 41

Ramayya Krishnan, Michael Smith, and Rahul Telang
Chicago, IL, 2003.
Ratnasamy, S., P. Francis, M. Handley, R. Karp, and S. Shenker. “A Scalable Content Addressable
Network,” Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM, San Diego, CA, 2001. Available at:
http://www.acm.org/sigcomm/sigcomm2001/p13-ratnasamy.pdf, last accessed 1 December 2003.
Reuters, “Traffic to filesharing sites drops,” 2003. Available at:
http://www.cnn.com/2003/TECH/internet/07/14/filesharing.drop.reut/index.html, last accessed July 14,
2003.
Rosenthal, D., M. Roussopoulos, P. Maniatis, M. Baker, “Economic Measures to Resist Attacks on a Peerto-Peer Network,” Working Paper, Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA, 2003.
Segal, D., “A New Tactic in the Download War: Online 'Spoofing' Turns the Tables on Music Pirates,”
Washington Post, August 21, 2002, Page A1.
Shneidman, J., D. C. Parkes, “Rationality and self-interest in peer to peer networks,” Proceedings of the
Second International Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems (IPTPS’03), Springer-Verlag, New York, 2003.
Available at: http://iptps03.cs.berkeley.edu/final-papers/rationality.ps, last accessed 1 December 2003.
Shuchman, L., “Universities Get Schooled on Napster,” The Industry Standard, September 8, 2000.
Available at: http://www.thestandard.com/article/0,1902,18402,00.html, last accessed 15 November
2003.
Singh, S.. S. Ramabhadran, F. Baboescu, A. C. Snoeren. “The Case for Service Provider Deployment of
Super-Peers in Peer-to-Peer Networks,” Working Paper, University of California at San Diego, San
Diego, CA, 2003.
Sirbu, M. Personal Communication, April 2002.
Sripanidkulchai, K., B. Maggs, and H. Zhang, “Efficient Content Location Using Interest-Based Locality in
Peer-to-Peer Systems,” Proceedings of IEEE Infocom 2003. Available at:
http://detache.cmcl.cs.cmu.edu/~kunwadee/research/papers/infocom03.pdf, last accessed 1 December
2003.
Stoica, I., R. Morris, D. Karger, M.F. Kaashoek, and H. Balakrishnan, “Chord: A Scalable Peer-to-peer
Lookup Service for Internet Applications,” Proceedings of SIGCOMM’01, 2001. Available at:
http://www.acm.org/sigcomm/sigcomm2001/p12.html, last accessed 1 December 2003.
Strahilevitz, L.J., “Charismatic Code, Social Norms, and the Emergence of Cooperation on the FileSwapping Networks,” John M. Olin Law and Economics Working Paper, Number 162, University of
Chicago, Chicago, IL, September, 2002.
Varian H., “The Social Cost of Sharing,” Working Paper, University of California at Berkeley, Berkeley,
CA, 2003.
Vishnumurthy, V., S. Chandrakumar, E. Gun Sirer, “KARMA: A Secure Economic Framework for Peer-toPeer Resource Sharing,” Working Paper, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, 2003.
Wake, B., “Canadian Band Gets Last Laugh in MP3 Fight,” Ottawa Citizen, September 22, 2000, p. A8.
Wang, Q., J. M. Peha, M. Sirbu, “Optimal Pricing for Integrated Services Networks” in McKnight and
Bailey eds., Internet Economics, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1997, pp. 353-376.
Woodward, C. J., D. C. Parkes, “Strategyproof Mechanisms for Ad Hoc Network Formation,” Working
Paper, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 2003.

42

The Economics of Peer-To-Peer Networks

AUTHORS
Ramayya Krishnan is
the William W. and
Ruth
F.
Cooper
Professor
of
Management Science
and
Information
Systems at the H. John
Heinz III School of
Public
Policy
and
Management.
He
received a B. Tech in Mechanical Engineering
from the Indian Institute of Technology,
Madras, India, and earned a M.S. in Industrial
Engineering and Operations Research and a
Ph.D. in Information Systems from the
University of Texas at Austin.
Professor Krishnan’s research interests
lie in problems that arise at the interface of
technology, business and policy aspects of
internet-enabled systems. His current research
projects investigate the emergence of virtual
communities in peer-to-peer networks, study
intermediation in e-markets and the design of
policies that take into account the competing
needs of promoting data access and protecting
privacy. His research on these topics is
supported by the National Science Foundation,
the Army Research Office, ARPA, and other
private foundations.
Professor Krishnan is the co-editor for
Telecommunications
and
Electronic
Commerce at the INFORMS Journal on
Computing, and an Associate Editor for
Management Science. He recently co-edited a
special issue of Interfaces on e-business and
special issues of Management Science on OR
and E-business. He is the immediate past
president of the INFORMS (Institute for
Operations Research and Management
Science) Computing Society. He has also
served on the National Science Foundation
(NSF) Expert Panel on Database and Expert
Systems and on several program committees
of information systems conferences. Professor
Krishnan, with a group of Master's students,
led the development of Artsnet, a world wide
web-based information service for the arts.
Artsnet is currently offered as a community
service by the Master of Arts Management
Program at the Heinz School.
Professor Krishnan's paper titled "On

Parameterized Transaction Models for Agents
in
Electronic
Markets
for
Decision
Technologies" was awarded the best paper
award at 1995 Workshop on Information
Technologies and Systems. He has received
best paper awards at the HICSS conference
(1997), the Workshop on Information
Technology and Systems (1996, 2000) and the
AIS Conference (2001).
Michael D. Smith is
an Assistant Professor
of
Information
Systems
and
Marketing at the H.
John Heinz III School
of Public Policy and
Management.
He
received a Bachelors
of
Science
in
Electrical
Engineering and a Masters of Science in
Telecommunications Science from the
University of Maryland, and a Ph.D. in
Management Science and Information
Technology from the Sloan School of
Management at MIT.
Professor Smith’s research relates to
the nature of structure and competition in
electronic markets and addresses the efficiency
of electronic markets with a particular focus on
markets for information goods, the uses of
network effects for competitive advantage, and
the measurement of consumer response to
retailer branding and retailer loyalty. His
research in this area has been published in
leading Management Science, Economics, and
Marketing journals and covered by press
outlets including The Economist, The Wall
Street Journal, Sloan Management Review,
The New York Times, and Business Week.
Professor Smith currently serves as an
Associate Editor for both Information Systems
Research and Decision Support Systems
journals. Prior to receiving his Ph.D., Dr.
Smith
worked
extensively
in
the
telecommunications and information systems
industries, first with GTE in their laboratories,
telecommunications, and satellite business
units and subsequently with Booz Allen and
Hamilton
as
a
member
of
their
telecommunications client service team. While
with GTE, Dr. Smith was awarded a patent for

The Journal of Information Technology Theory and Application (JITTA), 5:3, 2003. 43

Ramayya Krishnan, Michael Smith, and Rahul Telang

research applying fuzzy logic and artificial
intelligence techniques to the design and
operation of telecommunications networks.
Rahul Telang is an
Assistant Professor of
Information Systems at
the H. John Heinz III
School of Public Policy
and Management. He
received his earned his
doctorate in Information
Systems from GSIA,
Carnegie
Mellon
University. He has also received his Masters
from GSIA in Information Systems and MBA
from IIFT in International Business. Prof.
Telang did his undergraduate in Electrical and
Electronics Engineering from Birla Institute of
Technology and Science, India. He has also

44

worked in a Telecomm Software firm.
Professor Telang's research focus has
been economics of Information systems and
economic models of user choices for
technologies. He has been involved in
empirical as well as analytical studies of
competition and market structures of
information goods, software quality and
security and peer to peer networks. His current
work explores issues of market mechanism for
software vulnerabilities, role of patching in
software quality and optimal time to disclose
vulnerabilities. His current work on e-business
examines loyalty on the Internet, competition
and impact of used good markets retailers and
suppliers. He is also studying the issues related
to user participation in P2P networks, free
riding and pricing model for emails.

